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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL M. GARDNER
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
Case No. 16615
SHANNADEAN DIPO CHRISTENSEN
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for the recovery of damages claimed
by plaintiff by reason of defendant's failure to convey real property,
pursuant to an option agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded plaintiff as damages the sum
of $2, 000, finding that the market value of the real property subject to
the option agreement, at the time the option was to be exercised, was
$80, 000, which was also the option purchase price, less $2, 00 paid for
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the option, which sum was to be credited to the purchase price, and
which sum constituted plaintiff's damage.
snecial damages or attorney's fees.

The court did not award

From the judgment, the plaintiff

appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
sustained as being a proper award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 18, 1977, defendant executed an option agreement
to one Mike Heyrend for the purchase of a parcel of unimproved real
property located in Salt Lake County, herein referred to as the
"Christensen Property".

The option agreement (Ex. 3-P), provided

for the payment of $1, 000 as consideration for the option, and provided
for a purchase price of $80, 000, with the option fee of $1, 000 to be
applied to the purchase price, if the option was exercised.

The option

was subsequently extended for an additional $1, 000, to October 18,
1977 (Ex. P-9).

All negotiations were conducted by David Helm, as

agent for Mike Heyrend.

The option was obtained in an attempt to put
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together a development, which would include other property, including
property hereinafter referred to as the DeGooyer Property".

The

proposed development also involved zoning approval and other requirements (Ex P-137).

The final preparation of the option was done by

defendant's attorney, but was not subject to any restrictions or requirements involving the purchase of the DeGooyer Property.
An earnest money offer to the purchase of the DeGooyer
Property was made by Mike Heyrend on May 11, 1977 (Ex. P-2), subject
to the obtaining of the Christensen Property.
Defendant's option, by its terms, had to be exercised
by August 18, 1977 (Ex. P-3), and the DeGooyer earnest money
agreement had to be closed by August 15, 1977 (Ex. P-2).
On August 17, 1977, defendant's option was extended
for an additional 60 days, or until October 18, 1977 (Ex. P-9);
however, the DeGooyer earnest money agreement had expired by its
own terms.

Prior to the extension of the option agreement, Mike

Heyrend entered into an earnest money agreement on August 3, 1977
(Ex. P-12), agreeing to sell to Probe Construction Company his
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,.
interests in the Christensen option and other property, which agreement
was to be performed by September 15, 1977.

This agreement was not

completed within the time required of September 15, 1977.
On September 27, 1977, Heyrend submitted an earnest
money agreement to DeGooyer for the purchase of their property, which
agreement was not accepted until October 27, 1977 (Ex. P-8).

In the

meantime, Heyrend, on October 14, 1977, assigned the Christensen
option to Probe Realty, Inc. , by a written assignment (Ex. P-13D);
however, the assignment did not include the proposed DeGooyer earnest
money agreement (Ex. P-8), so that Probe Realty, Inc. , had only the
bare option to purchase the Christensen property, and nothing else.
Probe Realty, Inc., on October 18, 1977, assigned the option agreement
to Probe Realty, Inc., who assigned it to the plaintiff (Ex. P-21);
again, only the Christensen option, and nothing else, was assigned to
the plaintiff (R 190).

Plaintiff expended no money, plaintiff received no

assignment of monies spent, and plaintiff had nothing other than an
assignment of an option that was to expire on the day of the assignment.
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to damages consisting
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of monies spent by Mr. Heyrend for engineering expenses in connection
with a development plan for not only the Christensen Property, but also
the DeGooyer Property and other property.

He also claims damages

based upon the increased value that could be attributed to the Christensen
Property, when considered together with the DeGooyer Property as a
combined property; this, although plaintiff did not own or even have a
right to purchase the DeGooyer Property.
On October 18, 1977, when plaintiff attempted to exercise
the Christensen option, the earnest money offer (Ex. P-12) by Probe,
Inc. , to purchase the Heyrend interest in these properties had expired
by its terms, because it had not been completed on September 15, 1977
(R-188); the DeGooyer Property had an unaccepted offer by Mike
Heyrend pending, and the plaintiff had an assignment of the subject
option, subject to no qualifications or restrictions.
From the evidence, the court found that the measure of
damages was only the market value, without considering the possible
value increase that may have been associated with the acquisition of
the DeGooyer Property.

The court further concluded that the engineering
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costs and other expenses were not a less resulting from defendant's
failure to convey the property.
Since no evidence of attorney's fees was presented to the
court, the court did not make an award of fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES
AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET
VALUE AND OPTION PRICE.
The general rule followed by Utah courts is that a
purchaser, in a claim for wrongful refusal to convey under an agreement
of purchase, is entitled to damages equal to the difference between the
market value of the land at the time of the breach, and the agreed
purchase price.

This, in effect, gives the purchaser, as damages, the

benefit of his bargain in the event that the land appreciates in value.

In the case of Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2d 250,
this court said:
"The general rule as to damages in such circumstances is that where a vendor breaches his
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contract to convey property, the vendee is entitled
to the benefit of his bargain; that is, he is entitled
to the market value of the property at the time he
would be entitled to receive conveyance thereof,
less the amount he agreed to pay."
Justice J. Allan Crockett, in writing the foregoing opinion,
cited the cases of Smith v. Warr, Ut 1977, 564 P. 2d 771, and Bunnell v.
Bills, Ut 1962, 368 P. 2d 597.

In the Smith case, the court ruled as

follows:
"The rule followed by Utah is that benefit-of-the-bargain
damages are to be awarded for breach of contract for
the sale of real estate, regardless of the good faith of
the party in breach. "
In Bunnell, the court held:

"The measure of damages, where the vendor has
breached a land sale contract, is the market value
of the property at the time of the breach, less the
contract price to the vendee. "
In each of the foregoing cases, the court cited the case

of Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P. 2d 404, for the rule that:
"Proper measure of damages is the difference
between the offer and the market value. "
In this case, the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of

those allowed by the court, on the basis that he has been damaged
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because of the fact that the subiect property, if owned together with
surrounding properties, would be worth a great deal more than its
separate value as determined by appraisal (Ex. P-16, P-17).

The

court correctly found that the market value at time of the option was
to be exercised was the same as the option price, to-wit:

$80, 000,

and that therefore plaintiff was only entitled to the $2, 000 paid on the
option and to be credited against the purchase price.
Since the facts established that the option was given
without consideration for any other properties, and was an option to
purchase the subject property for $80, 000, notwithstanding any other
purchases, the claim that failure of the defendant to convey is the
basis for lost profit damages, is without basis.

This is particularly

true where the DeGooyer Property was neither owned by the plaintiff,
nor was it ever under an accepted earnest money agreement in favor
of the plaintiff or anyone else, at the time the option was to be
exercised (Ex. P-8).
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSh'1"G TO
AW ARD SPECIAL DAMAGES FOR COSTS AND
EXPENSES.
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It is generally the rule that no recovery can be had for
loss of profits which is dependent upon a subsequent or subordinate
agreement, even if the subsequent agreement was entered into upon
the faith of the principal contract, when the collateral contract was
not in the contemplation of the defaulting party at the time the principal
contract was entered into.

See Am Jur 2nd, Damages, P 95.

In addressing the question of special damages, such as
are here requested by plaintiff, this court, in Ranch Homes, Inc. , v.
Greater Park City Corp (Ut 1970), 592 P. 2d 620, stated:
"The rule is that the damages to be awarded for
breach of contract are those that are foreseeable
as a natural and probable consequence of the
breach. In other words, the only damages
recoverable are those that could reasonably be
foreseen and anticipated by the parties at the
time the contract was entered into. Mere knowledge of possible harm is not enough; the defendant
must have reason to foresee, as a probable result
of the breach, the damages claimed. "
The court further stated:
"The particular nature of an option requires that
the parties incur no more expenses than are necessary, and that those expenses reflect only what is
required to be done before the option can be exercised. "

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
9
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When you consider the many offers to purchase,
assignments of interest, and all other negotiations that went on between
Helm, Heyrend, Probe Construction, Probe Realty, Probe, Inc., and
the plaintiff Gardner, it is difficult to know who was developing what,
and exactly how the defendant's option was to be used.

There is no way

that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated or supposed that
the claimed expenses would be made.

Had she known of the juggling

act that was being performed, she could well have wondered whether
or not any real action would be taken with her property.

It is clear that at no time did the plaintiff expend any
funds for the expenses of development proposals, nor did he have an
assignment of such expenses.

It is also clear that the only property

subject to any valid claim on October 18, 1977, was the Christensen
Property.

In view of the fact that the plaintiff had received his interest

in the option on the last day it could be exercised would indicate that he
was only attempting to keep a "potential something" in hand.
no special damages, and the court correctly so ruled.
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He suffered

POlliT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION rn REFUSIN"G TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
It is recognized that a claim for attorney's fees must be

based upon a statutory provision or a contractual agreement.
If based upon a written contract providing for payment of

attorney's fees without specifying the amount, then the court is without
authority to fix any such fees without proof as to what is a reasonable
fee.

This is as much a part of plaintiff's case as any other part, and

must require the same attention.

vVhen plaintiff concludes its case and

rests, the court is in a position to render judgment.

At some point,

the evidence must conclude and the matter be presented for ruling.
Here, the plaintiff rested its case without evidence of the contract
requirement to pay fees --- to which the defendant could have responded --and without evidence as to amount.
In the case of FMA Financial Corp. v. Build Inv. ,
17 Ut 2 80, 404 P. 2d 670, the court, in addressing this subject, said:
"It is fundamental that the judgment must be
based upon findings of fact, which in turn must
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be based upon the evidence ... However, it was
an issue of fact which was denied. Thus, it was
a part of the-plaintiff's case to which it had the
burden of proving. Failing to offer proof of any
character on this issue had the same effect as
would the failure to offer proof as to any other
controverted issue. There is nothing upon which
to base a finding. "
The fact that the court refused to allow plaintiff to reopen
his case during final arguments was not an abuse of the court's discretior. ·
but was well within the discretion of the court.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the only interest that the plaintiff can
claim is a last minute assignment to the Christensen option, and that
any claimed damages must be based upon that interest only.

Therefore,

the court correctly determined that plaintiff's damage was the difference
between the market value of the property on October 18, 1977, less the
purchase price agreed.

Since the market value and the purchase price

were the same, the damages were properly assessed at the sum of
$2, 000, the amount paid on the option to be credited against the
purchase price.
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As to the matter of plaintiff's claim to special damages,
for engineering fees and other costs, the fact that those costs were
expended by someone other than plaintiff, without assignment to
plaintiff, and the fact that these were not costs anticipated by defendant,
nor expenses reasonably contemplated at the time the option was given,
clearly shows that plaintiff had no claim for those expenses and costs,
and that the court correctly denied plaintiff's claim.
The court, having no evidence as to attorney's fees,
properly did not make such award.
Respectfully submitted this _ _3:;.;r:...d"--- day of June
1980,
WALTER R. ELLETT

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent

I hereby certify that on this
3rd
day of June 1980, I mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to L. Benson
Mabey, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 102,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
/s/ Walt•r R. Ellett
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